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I intend to reconstruct David Ricardo’s philosophical and theological ideas concerning 
toleration, religion and morality, and the problem of evil. My reconstruction is carried 
out on the basis of evidence from the Ricardo Papers, the correspondence and his 
parliamentary speeches. I will highlight the context of statements he made on several 
occasions on such topics as the existence of a natural universal morality, the ethical 
essence of religion, the arbitrariness of any theological speculation and accordingly the 
uselessness of theology as such, unlimited toleration including even atheists, and the 
impossibility of theodicy or lack of any answer to the question why there is suffering 
the world. I will argue that the claims Ricardo endorses are typical of an early-
nineteenth-century ‘rational Christian’ and inspired by his experience as a Jew by birth 
and education, for a time fellow-traveller of the Quakers, and then a regular hearer at 
Unitarian services. I shall explore the implications of Ricardo’s interest in the religious 
sceptic Pierre Bayle, and particularly for his argument against theodicy, for his views on 
the scope and method of political economy.  I shall suggest that his view of the function 
of economic science, more modest than Malthus’s, is connected with a less optimistic 
attitude concerning the possibility of a more egalitarian and humane society. I will add 
that he believed that political economy should be a secular science precisely for 
theological reasons, namely that the anti-dogmatic kind of religious belief he declared to 
be rationally legitimate ruled out any kind of dogmatic ‘a-theology’ like the Laissez-
Faire Metaphysics cherished by his friend James Mill. 
          The structure of the paper is as follows: sect. 2 discusses the reasons why 
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philosophico-theological themes in the correspondence and the ‘Commonplace Book’ 
were overlooked, first by Sraffa and then by later commentators; sect. 3 discusses the 
contents of a pamphlet on Christianity in India by Trower and Ricardo’s comments; 
sect. 4 reconstructs the context and contents of Ricardo’s parliamentary speech on 
toleration; sect. 5 is a reconstruction of Ricardo’s reading notes on Bayle, Hume and 
other authors, then an examination of the discussion on theodicy in the correspondence 
with Mill and Malthus (sects. 6 and 7); finally, in sect. 9  a few conclusions are drawn 
on Ricardo’s views on theology, religious freedom, natural morality, theodicy, and their 
bearing on political economy. 
 
2. A hidden agenda in Ricardo’s Nachlass 
Readers of recent monographs on Ricardo may have failed to notice the existence of 
Ricardo’s ‘Commonplace Book’ from the period between 1817 and 18191. They may 
find some detailed, albeit scant, information in the Works and Correspondence (Ricardo 
1951 – 1973, 10: 393-398), but be left with the impression that nobody since Sraffa, has 
looked at it again.  As in the ‘Commonplace Book’, consisting actually of a set of 
notebooks and loose papers containing notes and abstracts, Ricardo’s reading plan is 
also documented in the correspondence with James Mill. Sraffa is as careful as ever in 
reporting the contents and, with some patience, the most gifted treasure hunters among 
readers might, for example, be able to reconstruct those passages from Pierre Bayle 
which Ricardo found of special interest. Yet, the criterion followed by Sraffa was to 
include in the Works and Correspondence just what is directly relevant to economic 
theory and nothing else. One consequence is, for example, that the Parliamentary 
discussion on the Christians’ Petition is reprinted but the text of the Petition itself is 
omitted. Another is that Sraffa tends to underestimate the importance of non-economic 
                                                 
1 Weatherall (1976) and Henderson (1997) completely ignore such readings; Milgate 




topics in the correspondence; for instance when Ricardo discusses Trower’s pamphlet, 
and the reader is left without any information about the contents of the publication 
under discussion; again, when the topic of theodicy emerges, namely in the notes on 
Malthus and the related correspondence with Mill, the reader is left without information 
either about the context or the co-text of the discussion. Perhaps the gravest 
consequence, however, is that information about the ‘Commonplace Book’ is packed 
into six pages. Nonetheless, what emerges clearly enough is the fact that 40 % of 
Ricardo’s readings consisted of modern history and travel journals and 60% of writings 
about the theory of knowledge and scepticism, the limits of human knowledge in 
religious subjects, the relationship of religion and morality, toleration, and theodicy or 
the problem of evil.  
 
 
3. Natural and Revealed morality in the correspondence with Trower  
It has been remarked more than once that Ricardo’s Principles, when compared with 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Malthus’s Principles, looks much more like a 
scientific treatise than a philosophical work. The impression arises from the 
circumstance that no hint is given of connections   either with a philosophical system as 
a whole or with philosophical or meta-economic claims of any sort. While agreeing that 
the impression is justified, I am not yet ready to endorse an unjustified inference from 
so shaky a basis, namely that the Principles look secular because Ricardo himself was 
‘secular’, an ‘unreligious mind’ who professed ‘atheism’2. I would object, first, that 
Ricardo never disclosed atheistic or agnostic leanings, secondly, that when he did 
discuss theological issues on a few occasions, the opinions he disclosed, far from 
                                                 
2 The phrases reported are by Depoortère (2001: 501) and Hartwell (1971: 36); 
Henderson (1997: 163) instead, somewhat more prudently writes that he was, if ‘not 
atheist, an agnostic’.  
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providing evidence to his privately held atheism or agnosticism, are quite consistent 
with his public image as a ‘rational Christian’.  
One example is provided by a letter to Hutches Trower of 8 Nov 1813 where he 
comments on a pamphlet the latter had published reporting an exchange – letters to the 
Editor of the Times – between ‘Laicus’ (pen name of the lawyer and committed 
Evangelical, John Poynder) and ‘an East India Proprietor’, that is, Hutches Trower 
himself. Ricardo, after writing that he had read the letters ‘with very great interest’ and 
that his own impression was that all that could be said on the subject had ‘been ably said 
on both sides’, concludes:  
My opinion coincided with yours before I read your letters and it is now 
very much strengthened by the facts and reasoning which you have brought 
forward’ (Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 6: 96).  
Poynder insists on the idea that Christianity is needed in India, as it is desirable 
that the faith of the Gospel should supplant the Hindu’s absurd, cruel, and immoral 
superstitions which give room to infanticide, the burning of widows and human 
sacrifices (Trower 1813: 3-4). He then adds that, in order to achieve this goal, the East 
India Company should establish an Episcopal Government in India while granting 
additional facilities to Missionaries to proceed there (Trower 1813: 5-10).  
Trower’s rejoinders illustrate the alleged dangers carried by an Episcopalian 
establishment in India with a considerable flow of missionaries. He asserts that ‘there 
are many reasons for deprecating any attempt to convert the Hindoos to Christianity’ 
(Trower 1813: 48) as both impossible and counterproductive (Trower 1813: 13-14), 
while rejecting  the claim that the Hindus are ‘in the most dreadful state of moral 
depravity’ and addicted to ‘every vice which can degrade our nature’ (Trower 1813: 
38), adding that ‘their vices are not attributable to their religion’ (Trower 1813: 14, 39), 
that their moral character ‘is not deserving of the severity with which it is censured’ 
(Trower 1813: 86-7) and that it ‘may be improved without their conversion’ (Trower 
1813: 87).  
From Ricardo’s admission that his opinions coincide with Trower’s something 
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may be inferred: not his atheism, but rather that he shared the following opinions:  
(i) people cannot and should not be forced to believe something whose truth 
they are not persuaded of;  
(ii) morality can be improved independently of adhesion to some given set of 
religious beliefs;  
(iii) the moral character of non-Christian nations is not necessarily perverse; 
(iv) the moral character of Christian nations  does not necessarily correspond to 
the purity of the Gospel’s teaching.  
Another item from Ricardo’s correspondence with Trower deserves discussion. In 
a letter of 26 Jan. 1818, Ricardo mentions John Bird Sumner as ‘a clergyman, the author 
of a clever book on the Records of Creations, in which Malthus’s system is not only 
defended for its truth, but for its affording proofs of the benevolence and goodness of 
the Creator’ (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 247). This carries more implications than any 
reader unaware of the context would draw. The ‘clever book’ was the Treatise on the 
Records of Creation (Sumner 1816). This was precisely a treatise on theodicy, trying to 
improve Paley’s argument in his Natural Theology by proving that Malthus’s principle 
of population could be read as one more application of the kind of ‘arithmetic’ approach 
to theodicy previously adopted by Paley. In the latter’s version, the argument is that the 
total sum of good in the world may be proved to outweigh that of evil once we define 
good as pleasure and evil as pain, and we include the total amount of pleasure and pain 
in the world, that is, that of all sentient beings, even including insects (Paley 1802: 491; 
cf. Cremaschi 2014: 90-4). Sumner’s ‘improved’ version asserts that the same result is 
reached in a simpler and less extravagant way if we instead define evil as pain and good 
as moral improvement (Cremaschi 2014: 135-9). In a nutshell, the solution is the 
following: (i) to some extent, evil will ‘arise necessarily from the law of nature’, and 
suffering is necessary in order ‘to make men look beyond the present day and the 
present state of things’ (Sumner 1816, 2: 258); (ii) evil is to some extent the result of 
ineffective institutions which, even when they do not ‘positively’ teach ‘improvidence’, 
are so framed as to discourage the learning of ‘prudence’ (Sumner 1816, 2: 301); (iii) 
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the main ‘cause of the greatest evil of the poor is ignorance’ (Sumner 1816, 2 : 292), 
but, as recent improvements in educational systems show, there is a possibility of great 
improvement in the human mind, and the ‘only true secret of assisting the poor is to 
make them agents in bettering their condition, and to supply them, not with a temporary 
stimulus, but with a permanent energy’ (Sumner 1816, 2: 338-9). 
Note that Ricardo, in his usual, calm manner, qualifies the book as ‘clever’, even 
though – being persuaded of the impossibility of any theodicy – he was obviously 
convinced that Sumner’s argument was fallacious. Here is his charitable comment:  
I am sorry to hear that Mr Sumner does not intend writing any more on 
Political Economy – his whole attention in future is to be devoted to the 
study of Theology. Whether in this future pursuit he will have an equal 
chance of benefiting mankind, as in the former, I have great doubts, or 
rather have no doubt at all (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 247-8). 
To the unaware reader, the latter sentence might sound like yet another revelation 
of an ‘unreligious mind’. Instead, what Ricardo is implying here is that theology (not 
faith) is a vain pursuit. The clarification may be in order here that what was meant by 
‘theology’ at the time was either natural theology (the discussion of the existence and 
attributes of the Deity on the basis of purely rational argument) or revealed theology 
(the discussion of the above topics in the light of assertions taken from the Holy 
Scripture combined with rational argument). Such twofold definition – it is as well to 
note – fails to overlap with current XXI century meaning, where historical and 
philological study of Biblical texts and related oral traditions is given pride of place. 
Theology, thus understood, had been the bête noire of eighteenth-century Aufklärer – 
that is, enlighteners – from all over Europe, including, besides fideist Bayle and deist 
Voltaire, also Adam Smith, arguably a theist and even a bona fide Presbyterian 
(Cremaschi forthcoming), and such an  orthodox enough Lutheran as Kant. The point of 
the attack was that theology as commonly understood was an impure mixture of 
unwarranted metaphysical claims going beyond the reach of human knowledge and 
assertions about God allegedly found in the Bible which are in fact not there, for 
although the Bible does teach moral precepts, such as to love one’s neighbour, it has a 
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noncommittal attitude vis-à-vis inquiries into God’s essence. Besides, while theodicy 
was a privileged chapter in post-Reformation theology, after the age of Leibniz and the 
Cambridge Platonists it was unanimously declared a vain enterprise by philosophers. 
Paley, Sumner and Malthus were the rear guard in an irreparably lost war.  
Let me add that Thomas Belsham, the Minister whose services Ricardo attended 
from 1814 to 1823 (Sraffa 1955a: 39-40; Weatherall 1976: 61-72; Cremaschi 2015), 
used to teach that faith is a practical attitude, not a theoretical one, that human 
knowledge is limited and it is useless to inquire into subjects ‘without the grasp of the 
human mind’ as Medieval divines used to do, for example into ‘the mode of the divine 
existence’ (Belsham 1826 – 1827, 2: 55) and that on ‘the most important doctrines of 
natural and revealed religion’ we should not require ‘rational knowledge’ but rest 
content instead with ‘rational belief’ (Belsham 1801: 110).  
 
4. Toleration in a parliamentary speech  
Milgate and Stimson deserve praise for having drawn attention to Ricardo’s 
political theory as something more than an appendix to his economic theory (Cremaschi 
1994). They have argued that his politics have little to share with Benthamite politics, 
that he ‘reached his conclusions before the publication of James Mill’s essay on 
Government’ (Milgate and Stimson 1995: 18), that his argument for extension of 
political rights and religious toleration is not just a reformulation of Bentham’s and 
Mill’s arguments, and besides that, at least in his last years, he adopted a markedly pro-
working class attitude (Milgate and Stimson 1995: 61, 119).  
I would add that he had alternative sources for his political ideas. For example, 
long before he first met Mill, his attendance at Hackney Chapel had offered him the 
opportunity to meet radicals and reformers of various tendencies. Note, in this 
connection, that Belsham complained, shortly after 1794, of abandonment of the Pulpit 
in favour of political militancy by fellow-Ministers (Williams 1833: 462). When 
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Ricardo and Mill first met, the political scenario was changing, radicals were re-
defining their political stance, and the idea of Reform was to become for many of them 
the catch-all formula for a new kind of liberalism, fostered by the Philosophical 
Radicals allied with an assorted company of ‘Friends of Reason’ in a number of 
campaigns. In some of these – think of the anti-slave-trade campaign, whose leader was 
an Evangelical MP – the company was really an oddly assorted one.   
Commitment to religious toleration was a matter of course for Ricardo for more 
than one reason, first as a Jew by birth, secondly as the husband of a Quaker, and thirdly 
as a Unitarian by choice. Toleration for every kind of religious opinion, including 
Atheism, was the first point of the Unitarian agenda since Theophilus Lindsey founded 
the first Unitarian congregation in Britain. Unitarians campaigned for religious 
toleration for obvious reasons: anti-Trinitarianism was not covered by the Toleration 
Act of 1689, and up to 1813 still fell under the penal law, and it was not until 1829 that 
the Corporate and Test Act was abolished (a law depriving Dissenters of full rights) 
(Stuart 2003; Dave 1978, 65-68; Watts 1998). Let me recall a remarkable comment by 
Ricardo on toleration for atheists: after a visit to Gatcomb by Sydney Smith, an 
Edinburgh Review editor, he writes to Mill on 9 Sept. 1821 that Smith ‘is always on the 
liberal side, but has a strong propensity to halt half way – he is for tolerating all 
religions, but is inclined to be intolerant to those whom he supposes to have no religion. 
I contended for Dr. Lindsay’s principle, that even the Atheist should be heard’ (Ricardo 
1951 – 1973, 9: 60)3.  
On 26 March 1823, while supporting in Parliament a petition for the release of 
Marry Ann Carlile who had been imprisoned on the basis of an indictment to have sold 
atheist literature, he declares that ‘a fair and free discussion ought to be allowed on all 
religious topics’ (Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 5: 288). In a letter of 4 April 1823 to Isaac Lyon 
Goldsmid, a leading figure in the campaign for Jewish emancipation, he writes: ‘I carry 
                                                 
3 James Lindsay was a Prebyterian Unitarian Minister with whom Ricardo was 
acquainted and who advocated ‘not only for Toleration, but for that unbounded freedom 
of opinion, to which alone genuine Christianity must owe its future prevalence, and its 
permanent influence’ (Lindsay 1813: 22). 
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my principles of toleration very far; – I do not know how, or why any line should be 
drawn, and am prepared to maintain that we have no more justifiable ground for 
shutting the mouth of the Atheist than that of any other man’ (Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 9: 
278). 
And in fact, Ricardo’s Parliamentary Speech on religious freedom was occasioned 
by a ‘Christians’ Petition against the Prosecution of Unbelievers’, whose ‘prime mover’ 
was Aspland (Sraffa 1955a: 41). The petition was presented to the House of Commons 
by radical MP Joseph Hume and supported by Ricardo. Starting with the argument that 
‘belief does not in all cases depend upon the will’ (Aspland et al. 1823: 363), the 
petitioners asked the Honourable House to act in order to abolish the possibility of 
prosecution of unbelievers (Aspland et al. 1823: 364). Ricardo’s speech, while referring 
to Paley and other Anglican authorities, claimed that the law should not establish any 
limit to discussion on theoretical aspects of religion and that the public authority has no 
competence to judge whether such discussion is conducted with respect or instead with 
‘levity and ribaldry’, and he vindicated ‘a more large and liberal spirit of toleration’ 
(Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 5: 324), contending for ‘the general right of self-opinion, and for 
the unfettered liberty of discussion’ (1951 – 1973, 5: 331) 
The first argument is that imposing profession of belief in a future state is self-
defeating: 
what an absurd and immoral mode did the law provide for estimating the 
credit of a man’s faith before his testimony was legally admissible! When 
the question was put to a witness, ‘Do you believe in a future state?’ If he 
were a conscientious man, entertaining seriously such an opinion, his 
answer must be in the negative, and the law said he should not be heard; but 
if he were an immoral man, and disregarded truth, and said, ‘I do believe in 
a future state,’ although in his conscience he disbelieved in it, then his 
evidence was admissible, and his hypocrisy and falsehood secured him 
credibility. Now, there would be some sense in the law, if it declined 
tempting the hypocrisy of the individual, or his fear of the world’s hostility 
or prejudice, and let in other evidence to establish, from previous knowledge 
of the individual, whether or not he ought not to be admitted as a witness; 
but as it stood, it was absurd and ridiculous (Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 5: 327) 
10 
 
One more argument advanced is that ‘on so abstract religious subjects, upon 
which it was quite impossible to obtain universal assent. No man had a right to say to 
another, ‘My opinion upon religion is right, and yours is not only wrong when you 
differ from me, but I am entitled to punish you for that difference’’ (Ricardo 1955-73, 5: 
324-5). 
Another is that moral obligation does not arise exclusively from religion, and it 
has a previous source, the force of ‘moral impressions’. Note that, besides being an 
assertion of the existence of a natural morality, this statement also alludes to a notion 
utterly incompatible with Benthamite ethics, namely the idea of ‘moral impressions’.  
The report adds that Ricardo declared that 
he firmly believed in the possibility of a man’s being very honest for all the 
social purposes and essential obligations of the community in which he 
lived, and still not assenting to the belief of a future state. He fully admitted 
that religion was a powerful obligation, but he denied it to be the only 
obligation – it was, in fact, one which was superadded to the general force 
of moral impressions – it were a libel upon human nature to say otherwise 
(Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 5: 327) 
Then he reportedly repeated a neat distinction between opinions on theoretical 
matters and a capacity to grasp the moral quality of actions. He declared  
that the obligation of religion was not alone considered as the test of moral 
truth, and that a man might be very sceptical upon doctrinal points, and yet 
very positive in the control of moral impressions distinct from religious faith 
(Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 5: 328) 
At last he introduced a distinction between positive sciences, where some unerring 
criteria for ending controversies exist, and other disciplines, bound to remain forever – 
so to say – the battlefield of unending struggles. He said that there was 
not in polemics, as in astronomy, one unerring criterion to which the 
common credence of mankind bowed – it was not like the rising sun, or any 
of the other phenomena of nature, which were bound by indissoluble and 
indispensable laws; but, on the contrary, a subject open to conflicting 
opinions (Ricardo 1951 – 1973, 5: 329). 
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To sum up: Ricardo’s reasons in favour of unlimited religious freedom were 
typically those endorsed by ‘rational Christians’, namely, that (i) the essence of religion 
is morality, not speculative truth; (ii) acceptance of theoretical claims is a matter of 
rational persuasion, not will; (iii) the non-believer may enjoy as strong moral 
motivation, deriving from ‘moral impressions’ independent of opinions on theoretical 
issues, as the believer; (iv) human nature is good enough to grant that even a non-
believer may perceive such moral impressions; (v) to controversy on theoretical truths 
in religion, unlike Astronomy, an end cannot be put by any unerring criteria; (vi) no one 
has the authority to silence opponents in matters of religious opinion; (vii) any attempt 
to force profession of religious belief upon non-believers as a proof of their moral 
accountability would be self-defeating and demoralizing.  
 
 
5. Natural morality, theodicy and toleration in the Commonplace Book 
More evidence of Ricardo’s interest in theological issues may be found in the 
‘Commonplace Book’, consisting of two notebooks and a few pages of notepaper 
containing reading notes from 1817 and 1818. Part of this philosophical reading 
concerns the theory of knowledge and scepticism, including Locke, Hume and Dugald 
Stewart4. I have already mentioned that more than half of it verges on religious subjects. 
Sraffa, though as accurate as ever, seems to have been less than enthusiastic about 
Ricardo’s religious interests and did not allow much room for them. A rather more 
analytical reconstruction may be of some use.  
In the 1817 notebook Ricardo wrote down a select list of titles of chapters with 
the addition of a number of excerpts copied in full from two of Pierre Bayle’s works 
(Ricardo Papers; cf. Ricardo 1951-1973, 10: 393). The first is Pensées diverses sur la 
Comète. The topics Ricardo deemed worth examining are, in chs. XLVI, LXXXIV, 
                                                 
4 For a reconstruction see Cremaschi and Dascal (1996: 496-7). 
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XCIX, C, CVIII, that opinions keep on being widely shared albeit contradicted by 
experience just because of their antiquity and generality, and that even visions firmly 
believed by several witnesses turn out patently false (Bayle 1682: 1, 130-3; 1, 219-21; 
1, 266-73; 1, 292-3); in ch. LXIX, that right reason teaches us to honour God not by 
ceremonies, but rather through the practice of virtue (Bayle 1682: 1, 179-82); in chs. 
LXXXI and XCI, that religion is constantly used by rulers either to defend themselves 
or to manipulate their subjects (Bayle 1682: 1, 205-9; 1, 242-4); in ch. LXXXVIII, that 
conversions obtained by force or bought with money are counterproductive (Bayle 
1682: 1, 228-35); in chs. CXX, CXXIII and CXLVI, that idolatry is more obnoxious 
than irreligion and atheism does not necessarily lead to corruption of morals (Bayle 
1682: 1, 315-18; 2, 5-8; 2, 37-9); in chs. CXXXIV – CXXXVIII, that experience shows 
that religion fails to correct vicious inclinations because, more than on principles they 
profess,  men tend to act on particular judgements dictated by the passion prevailing at 
the moment (Bayle 1682: 2, 8-18).  
The second work is the Dictionnaire historique et critique. From this, just two 
excerpts are reported. The first, from note B in the entry ‘Anabaptistes’, reports that 
excesses by this sect offered the Roman party an occasion to defame  Reformation, and 
that the Reformers, in order to confront competition ‘shouted with all their strength’ 
against the Anabaptists (Bayle 1697, 1: 200). The other is from note 1 to the entry 
‘Gregoire I’ and it reports the anecdote of a monk at Pavia Chartreuse pointing to 
Giangaleazzo Visconti’s burial place as that of a ‘great saint’, and justifying such 
qualification by the maxim followed in his own country, namely, to ‘call saints all those 
who do us good’; Bayle comments that this maxim, far from being a typical Italian 
product, ‘is followed at every time and in every country’ (Bayle 1697, 2: 598).  
Ricardo carefully read more entries. In letters to Mill of 12 Sept. 1817 (Ricardo 
1951-1973, 7: 190) and 9 Nov 1817 (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 206) he mentions those on 
‘Manichéens’ (Bayle 1697, 3: 302-7), ‘Pauliciens’ (3: 624-636), and ‘Marcionites’ (3: 
314-9). These discuss the doctrines of the sect of Manicheans or Paulicians – as they 
were named in Armenia – and of that of Marcionites. These sects used to set the 
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merciful God of the New Testament against the allegedly merciless God of the Old 
Testament. The point Bayle wants to make here is that it is hard to account for the 
existence of evil without allowing for two original co-existing principles, and that to 
refute this idea is even more difficult for Christians than for the polytheists, since they 
are bound either to deny God’s omnipotence or to make God the author of evil.  
The second notebook, probably from 1818, includes an excerpt from ch. 14 of 
John Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity which declares that among the ancient 
Heathens some philosophers cultivated the knowledge of one God, but few went to their 
schools ‘to be instructed in their duties’, and most people rested content with sacrifices 
and services, while ‘the priests made it not their business to teach them virtue’ (Locke 
1695: 147). 
Besides, there are two excerpts from David Hume’s Natural History of Religion. 
The first is from sect. 12, declaring that in all ages religious conviction ‘is more affected 
than real’,  and ‘the assent in these matters is some unaccountable operation of the mind 
between disbelief and conviction, but approaching much nearer the former than the 
latter’ (Hume 1757: 72); the other, from sect. 14, declares that the virtuous man ‘is 
drawn to his duty without any effort or endeavour’ by the force of the natural ties he has 
with his family and community, to which a ‘sentiment of order and moral beauty’ is 
joined, without any ‘pretence to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is deemed no 
more than what we owe to society and to ourselves’ (Hume 1757: 82).  
Reading notes follow from two works by Richard Watson, the Regius Professor of 
Divinity at Cambridge and Bishop of Llandaff, An Apology for Christianity (1776), 
being a rejoinder to Edward Gibbon, and An Apology for the Bible (1796), being a 
rejoinder to Thomas Paine. The first excerpt from the former book says that it is ‘just as 
illiberal in Divines, to attribute the scepticism of every Deist to wilful infidelity; as it is 
in the Deists, to refer to the faith of every Divine to professional bias’ (Watson 1776: 
86-7). The next declares that Gibbon’s polemics against miracles go beyond the point 
by relying on an idea of unchangeable laws of nature as if they were fully known 
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(Watson 1776: 92-6), while there ‘was a time no one was acquainted with the laws of 
magnetism; these suspend in many instances the laws of gravity; nor can I see, upon the 
principle in question, how the rest of mankind could have credited the testimony of their 
first discoverer; and yet to have rejected it, would have been to reject the truth’ (Watson 
1776: 92). 
Three excerpts follow from An Apology for the Bible, the first on fairness in 
controversy: ‘A philosopher in search of truth forfeits with me all claim to candour and 
impartiality, when he introduces railing for reasoning, vulgar and illiberal sarcasm in 
the room for argument’ (Watson 1796: 29). The second is a defence of prophecies from 
the Hebrew Bible (Watson 1796: 160-2). The third is about Deism, arguing that it runs 
into the same difficulties as revealed religion (Watson 1796: 367-9), among these ‘the 
existence of evil, moral and natural, in the work of an infinite being, powerful, wise, 
and good’ and ‘the gift of freedom of will, when the abuse of freedom becomes the 
cause of general misery’ (Watson 1796: 369). 
The last notes are from An Examination of the Bishop of London’s Discourse 
concerning Prophecy by Conyers Middleton, a Cambridge fellow with a taste for 
theological controversy. The first excerpt is again on fairness in controversy. It declares 
that the Bishop ‘forgot surely that he was now discoursing from the Press, and not from 
the Pulpit: for though Ipse dixits may carry authority with them, where no body can 
contradict, yet they would never pass for arguments, where speech and debate are free’ 
(Middleton 1750: 35). The second is about ‘questions, wholly speculative, fruitless and 
inexplicable’, arguing that ‘the foundation of all religion’ lies in ‘those practical, social 
and real duties, which our reason and senses prescribe in common to all’ (Middleton 
1750: 196-7).  
To draw a balance, it would be a risky enterprise to try to evince Ricardo’s own 
opinions from evidence of what he found noteworthy. Nonetheless, fixing a list of 
topics he deemed worth discussing would already be a result of some interest. A 
reasonable list might be as follows: (i) the existence of the tendency to believe 
15 
 
whatsoever opinion on authority; (ii) the need for mutual respect in religious 
controversy; (iii) the ethical character of all true religious teaching; (iv) the superstitious 
and immoral character of religion reduced to ceremonies and sacrifices; (v) the 
possibility of morality without a foundation on religious belief and falsity of allegations 
of immorality against Atheism; (vi) the irrelevance of speculative theology; (vii) the 
irrelevance of Deism as an alternative to revealed religion as being just one more 
speculative theology leaving decisive questions unanswered; (viii)  the miscarriage of 
all philosophical trials in theodicy. This is no more than an agenda for discussion, and 
yet there is enough to refute a number of claims advanced by some commentators.  
 
6. Theodicy in the correspondence with Mill 
The last point listed above, namely the impossibility of any theodicy, was again 
discussed by Ricardo on other occasions, when he manifested his interest in the issue 
and expressed the opinion that all philosophical trials in theodicy had miscarried – note 
that among these were those staged by the young Malthus, Paley, Sumner, and the 
mature Malthus – thus taking a stance close to Kant’s refusal of theodicy, of which he 
was obviously enough unaware. But he also rejected – as politely as ever – Mill’s 
implication that the failure of any theodicy leaves Atheism as the only option. In fact, 
while discussing Bayle in letters to Mill of 12 Sept 1817 (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 190) 
and 9 Nov 1817 (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 206) he writes:  
On these difficult points I keep my mind in a state of doubt from which in 
this world I never can be relieved. To account for evil in a world governed 
by a Being of unbounded benevolence and power is or appears to be 
impossible. It is as puzzling a question now as in the early times of which 
Bayle writes. Is it much different from the Manichean heresy to say that the 
Creator’s benevolence is unbounded, but that his power is limited – and thus 
to account for evil? (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 206; my emphasis)5. 
                                                 
5 King (2013: 32) writes that, even though we cannot establish Ricardo’s views on 
religion, at least this letter proves that he was ‘agnostic on the problem of evil’. The 
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Mill answers, on 3 December 1817, that he completely agrees with the last 
remark, for supposing that God’s power is limited amounts to supposing ‘that there is 
some power in the universe, which the Deity cannot controul,  and which has a tendency 
to produce evil’ (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 212). But, while Ricardo’s implication was that 
all philosophical trials in theodicy will end up with miscarriage, and we can hope at 
most for an answer to the question on the causes of evil in a world to come, Mill 
typically presumes that this is a water-proof reason for Atheism, and goes on attacking 
alleged hypocrisy by somebody else. In fact, he adds: ‘Poor Mr. Malthus – If I am not 
mistaken, it is he who solves the difficulty about the existence of evil in this manner. 
What a misfortune – what a cruel misfortune, it is, for a man to be obliged to believe a 
certain set of opinions, whether they be fit, or not, to be believed! (Ricardo 1951-1973, 
7: 212-3). That is, he presumes that Malthus, while being obviously aware of the  
undeniable conclusion he has presented, goes on – unlike virtuous Mill who consistently 
abandoned the career of ‘a priest’ for which he had been educated – teaching what he 
cannot obviously believe in order to keep his own ‘prebends’. Besides the usual  
arrogance it betrays, the comment is particularly inept in failing to notice changes in 
Malthus’s theodicy, from 1798 to 1803 and 1817 (Cremaschi 2014: 79-81, 94-99, 145-
51) and assuming that – plausible or implausible as it might be – it was still the 1798 
one which invited precisely such criticism.  
Note that Ricardo’s answer of 18 Dec 1817 politely avoids comments on Mill’s 
own presumptions and instead introduces what is perhaps an indirect objection. He 
shifts to a comment about religion within a discussion of Mill’s recently published 
History of British India (Mill 1817) that he had started to read. He writes that Mill’s 
own view of the manner in which ‘mankind become acquainted with the idea of the 
Supreme Being is much the same as that of Hume’ (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 229) and 
‘the adulatory expressions’ with which primitives address him are no proof ‘of any just 
or sublime conception of him’ (Ricardo 1951-1973, 7: 229). This is perhaps a polite but 
                                                                                                                                               
comment is misleading, for agnosticism is the claim that we cannot answer the question 
of God’s existence while theism without theodicy is a respectable enough tradition.  
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malicious way of responding, for Mill did not admit of ‘any just or sublime conception’ 
of God but just rejected any conception of God.  
Besides the opinions that both metaphysics and speculative theology are vain 
enterprises, the idea  that theodicy is a risky business is something else that Ricardo had 
heard at Unitarian ‘instructions’. Like every other eighteenth-century philosopher, 
Priestley had tried to solve the problem of evil, and his solution resembles Leibniz’s 
solution. He writes that, since ‘all evils and inconveniences have final causes’, once the 
final cause has ceased to exists, ‘evils tend to be eliminated by themselves’ (Priestley 
1762: 250), and even  
everything painful and disagreeable in the world appears to a philosopher 
[...] to be excellently provided as a remedy of some greater inconvenience, 
or a necessary means of a much greater happiness; so that, from this 
elevated point of view, he sees all temporary evils and inconveniencies to 
vanish, in the glorious prospect of the greater good to which they are 
subservient (Priestley 1767: xvii).  
Belsham writes, in a first phase, that philosophical necessitarianism is an appealing 
doctrine also in so far as ‘it demonstrates the inseparable connexion between moral and 
natural evil, and proves that by the established course of nature every vice shall be 
followed by adequate punishment’ (Belsham 1801: 310), that ‘the preponderance of 
happiness’ is ‘very considerably on the side of virtue’ and, ‘generally speaking, every 
purpose of substantial justice is answered independent of a future state’ (Belsham 1801: 
351); this doctrine is also ‘inseparably connected with that of optimism’, showing that 
all events are ‘necessary parts of a great system, which shall eventually produce the 
greatest possible sum of happiness and virtue, both to the universe and to individuals’ 
(Belsham 1801: 313). Yet, later on, he writes that, when we consider the world as a 
whole, ‘we see enough’ to be satisfied  
that the result of it is a great preponderance of good [...] but when we 
consider the divine dispensations in detail, we shall immediately discover 
that they are far beyond the reach of human sagacity (Belsham 1826 – 1827, 
2: 36-7) 
and the fact ‘that evil, natural and moral, is unavoidable in the works of God, is a 
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problem of very difficult solution’ (Belsham 1826 – 1827, 2: 37). To sum up: the only 
admissible argument to reconcile the Creator’s goodness and what experience proves 
about the course of the world is that the amount of good may overwhelm the amount of 
evil in the long run, but we can neither prove this in a totally convincing way nor can 
we explain evil-in-the-short-run away as being merely apparent.  
 
7. Theodicy in the correspondence with Malthus 
In the Essay on Profits of 1815 Ricardo mentions Providence. He apparently 
wants to draw from one of Malthus’s claims such further implications as to lead to 
implications opposite to the original ones. He notes that 
it has been remarked, in reference to a single country, that if the crops are 
bad in one district, they are generally productive in another; that if the 
weather is injurious to one soil, or to one situation, it is beneficial to a 
different soil and different situation; and, by this compensating power, 
Providence has bountifully secured us from the frequent recurrence of 
dearths. If this remark be just, as applied to one country, how much more 
strongly may it be applied to all the countries together which compose our 
world? Will not the deficiency of one country be made up by the plenty of 
another? (Ricardo 1951–1973, 4: 31). 
To be fair, God is mentioned here in the context of a tu quoque argument, and 
thus his mention cannot be assumed to imply direct commitment to his existence. 
A similar, but somewhat more committed, concession is made in his Notes on 
Malthus. His objection concerns the latter’s qualification of rent as a ‘bountiful gift of 
Providence’ and the argument is that rent comes from limited resources such as land, 
but not from unlimited ones, and that it is scarcity, not intrinsic usefulness, to give a 
price to scarce resources. Thus the problem for a political economist is not 
whether the Creator did not consult our real happiness by limiting the 
productive powers of the land, but whether the fact be not, that he has so 
limited it, – while He has given us an unbounded supply of water, of air, and 
has set no limits to the use we may make of the pressure of the atmosphere, 
the elasticity of steam and many other services rendered to us by nature 
19 
 
(Ricardo 1951–1973, 2: 210; cf. 337-8).  
On balance, Ricardo’s argument seems to be in favour of a less value-laden 
approach in economic theory. Note that he does mention the Creator here and in the 
previous quote he had not hesitated in mentioning Providence. It is true that both 
mentions are made for the sake of the argument, namely, that he is drawing implications 
from Malthus’s own argument while trying to refute it by a reductio ad absurdum. Yet, 
he seems to mention the Creator or Providence without any special caution. It seems 
that the argument here is both of a tu quoque nature and one that Ricardo could 
seriously endorse, even though with opposite conclusions. His main concern seems to 
be exclusion not of religion but of ‘metaphysics’; that is, he wants to rule out our 
capacity to detect an axiological and teleological order in the world and to fix 
boundaries to the scope of human knowledge. In more detail, he wants to confine 
human knowledge to the discovery of correlations and formulation of general laws. This 
may depend in turn on limited scepticism, one of the doctrines taught by Belsham. In a 
word: he seems to favour a more ‘secular’ approach to political economy but, in more 
detail, he favours a more secular approach in so far as he favours a more ‘modest’ view 
of the science or a more limited view of its scope, amounting to the study of correlations 
between observable magnitudes. Thus he seems to believe that political economy has – 
in Malthus’s own words turned upside down – less ‘resemblance to the sciences of 
morals and politics’ than to ‘the science of mathematics’ (Malthus 1820, 2: 518; cf. 
Cremaschi 2010). This view in turn is inspired, rather than by a Cartesian or rationalist 
trust in the unlimited powers of human knowledge, by moderately sceptical awareness 
of its limits (Cremaschi and Dascal 1996: 495-504; 1998: 248-9). In turn, this did not 
result from the attitude of a ‘true scientist’ in contrast with the allegedly muddled, 
moralizing attitude of priest Malthus; on the contrary, we face here one of the many 
billiard-ball effects with which the history of science at large is disseminated, namely, 





8.  The impossibility of theodicy and its consequences for political 
economy  
 Ricardo’s views on the possibility of faith and the impossibility of theology, the 
independence of morality from religion and unbounded freedom of enquiry are of 
remarkable interest for a reconstruction of both his biography, political views and 
activity as a politician and philanthropist and the intellectual background – natural 
science, philosophy, theology, political theory – against which his contributions to 
political economy took their course. This would be enough to make the present 
reconstruction of some interest to historians of economic thought too. But what is 
especially important for them is the most typically theological theme –  and apparently 
most abstruse one –  theodicy.  
In 1798 Malthus had characteristically tried to square the circle of asymmetry 
between growth of resources and growth of population by means of a very particular 
kind of theodicy introduced in order to fill the gap. He had been attacked on every side, 
one of them being Christian charity, and had carried out an egregious retreat in several 
steps, while claiming he had always been right. In Ricardo’s Library there was a copy of 
Malthus’s Essay on Population, 5th ed. 1817 (Sraffa 1955b: 398). This suggests that he 
read this work in the 1817 edition and, by implication, that he may have been exposed 
to Malthus’s own theodicy in its third version, which was different from the original as 
well as from the already revised 1803 one. Besides, as documented in the 
‘Commonplace Book’, it was precisely in 1817 that Ricardo started reading Bayle’s 
work. The fact that the discussion of theodicy in the correspondence with Mill also 
dates from the last months of that year suggests that Ricardo’s interest in theodicy did 
not arise from a sudden conversion from economic to religious interests, but was 
precisely occasioned by the tangle that political economists of the time were trying to 
untie, namely the growth of wealth and its link with poverty, that is, the causes of social 
evil or the viability of some kind of social theodicy. Let me add that Malthus’s 
discovery of the principle of population occurred in the context of a refutation of a new 
kind of theodicy, that is, the atheistic anthropodicy centred on an idea of unlimited 
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human perfectibility proposed by William Godwin and the Marquis of Condorcet 
(Cremaschi 2014: 79-84). This was just one step in an on-going process transforming 
theodicy from a highly abstract discussion into ‘applied theology’, hardly any strange 
invention by Malthus himself. In fact, the eighteenth-century discussion of population 
was mainly of a theological kind, exploring the role of divine providence behind the 
growth and decrease of population, shifting from discussion of the causes of 
metaphysical, physical, and moral evil – or of human finitude, suffering, and 
wickedness – to that of the causes of misery and vice unavoidably going with misery 
(La Vergata 1990: 20-40).   
Let me recall briefly what Malthus’ theodicy was originally and how it was 
restyled in its third 1817 version. The eighteenth-century Anglican ethics to which 
Malthus was exposed while at Cambridge elaborated on Richard Cumberland’s attempt 
to mark a third way between the intellectualist and the voluntarist view of the law of 
nature, yielding a rational-choice account of natural law, where a law-giver God 
chooses from among a number of possible sets of laws on the basis of a maximandum, 
happiness for his creatures. Such a solution tried to settle at once the problem of evil 
and the foundation of moral obligation by proving that God’s choice is justified in so far 
as it is the one that reduces the mass of suffering in the world to a minimum. Malthus’s 
1798 theodicy tried to prove that evils deriving from action of the principle of 
population were partial evils in so far as they enforced exertion by human beings, thus 
transforming matter into mind (Malthus 1798: 97-101; cf. Cremaschi 2014: 764-7). A 
second version, based on William Paley’s Natural Theology, is presented in the 1803 
Essay. It contends that there is a moral order in the world, less tragic than the one of the 
first Essay, and it depends on the possibility of avoiding evils carried by the principle of 
population through a combination of prudence and chastity. Once it has been proved 
that the passions may be dominated, and that a world where passions are under control 
would be a comparatively happy place, the world turns out to be not an evil place, and 
its Creator to be omniscient, benevolent, and perhaps also omnipotent (Malthus 1803, 2: 
88-95; cf. Cremaschi 2014: 94-9).  A third version is presented in the 1817 5th edition, 
arising from reaction to criticism by evangelical authors such as John Sumner and 
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Thomas Chalmers. In this version moral improvement becomes the variable to be 
maximised in the divine plan.  The resulting new theodicy is more prudent than both 
former versions, amounting either to the Cambridge Platonists’ optimism made softer or 
to a claim analogous to the Kantian one of the failure of any theodicy. The signs of this 
change are, first, that inequality and poverty are no longer accepted in a Paleyite fatalist 
spirit and that existing conditions of society are now justified on the argument, not that 
they are the happiest available, but that they are the most favourable to moral 
development;  secondly, that population growth is now not an actual cause of social evil 
but just an always present potential cause, and that its negative effects can be effectively 
checked by moral constraint, that is, delayed marriage without irregular gratification, in 
turn made possible by, or going together with, more education, more self-respect, and 
more self-reliance (Malthus 1803, 1: 19;  2: 214-5, 251; cf. Cremaschi 2014: 145-55). 
James Mill was far from immune from such concerns. If we are to believe his 
son’s account, among the reasons for his decision to abandon the profession of 
Presbyterian preacher for which he had been educated, there was ‘a state of perplexity’ 
when facing ‘a world so full of evil’ that made it impossible to believe that such a world 
‘was the work of an Author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and 
righteousness’ (Mill 1873: ch. 2). And, oddly enough, in his own Elements of Political 
Economy, apparently an axiomatic and deductive introduction to the economic science, 
he smuggles in an attempt to settle the problem of social theodicy. First he argues, in a 
factual tone, that, if the condition of ‘the great body of the people’ is not easy and 
comfortable, it can only be made so by one of two methods:     either by quickening the 
rate at which capital increases, or retarding the rate at which population increases (Mill 
1821: 44), and, if we cannot secure ‘human happiness’ by making capital increase as 
fast as population, the practical problem is to find a  way to limit the number of births 
(Mill 1821: 65). He then goes on to argue that a sociological, not purely economic, fact 
should also be taken into account. The possibility that mankind may advance in 
knowledge and discover ways to take more command over the means of happiness 
depends ‘upon the existence of a class of men who have their time at their command; 
that is, who are rich enough to be freed from all solicitude with respect to the means of 
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living in a certain state of enjoyment. It is by this class of men that knowledge is 
cultivated and enlarged’ (Mill 1821: 63). This would not be so bad, if Mill did not  shift  
without previous notice, from cause-effect relationships to value judgments. In  fact he 
adds:  
What is the class of men by whom the greatest happiness is enjoyed, […] 
they who are raised above solicitude for the means of subsistence and 
respectability […] the men of middle fortune […] who, having their time at 
their own disposal, freed from the necessity of manual labour, subject to no 
man’s authority, obtain, as a class, the greatest sum of human enjoyment. 
For the happiness, therefore, as well as the ornament of our nature, it is 
peculiarly desirable that a class of this description should form as large a 
proportion of each community as possible (Mill 1821: 64; my emphasis).   
Note that this is no longer value-free scientific consideration, being rather a moral 
evaluation of the condition of society. And here, after having applied the 
Malthusian principle of population in its original crude version, he also applies – 
without spelling it out – the Benthamite principle of utility also in its crude 
original formulation, where only the total amount of happiness is taken as a 
criterion of justice, with the twofold effect of transforming a purely theoretical 
discussion of  economic laws into a normative theory of justice, and of 
introducing a Calvinist atheist doctrine of predestination according to which only 
a few – here, the middle class – are destined for salvation and everyone else 
should be happy and content for them. 
Robert Owen too was no stranger to these problems. It is worth reporting a table-talk 
remark by Ricardo on Owen’s views, reported in John Lewis Mallet’s diary (14 Jan 
1820) on free will, necessitarianism, theodicy and, remarkably, the possibility to fight 
social evils. He writes:  
 
Ricardo knows Owen intimately. He says that he is a thorough 
necessitarian; but being at the same time a Deist, he believes that all works 
for the best. It were to be wished, upon this principle, that he would be less 





If we try to spell out the full implications of this comment, we might – with due 
caution – head towards the conclusion that Ricardo was implying the following: (i) 
belief that all works for the best or, in eighteenth-century philosophical jargon, 
Optimism, or the claim that there is an answer to the question on evil, carries a paradox, 
the same as the one Adam Smith pointed out with regard to Stoicism, that is, it makes 
moral judgment and action unnecessary; (ii) the above optimistic belief derives from a 
combination of necessitarianism and Deism. This comment, no less than Ricardo’s 
comments in the correspondence with Mill and Malthus, and his reading notes in the 
Commonplace Book highlight the relevance theodicy had – in Ricardo’s view – for the 
issues of population, the relationship of rent, profits and wages, poverty, the condition 
of the working class – namely the topics of his chapter on machinery of 1819 that will, 
by no means coincidentally, occasion Mill’s complaint. The fact that our world is not a 
Panglossian one leaves nonetheless a hope that something better is possible.  
His comment on Owen is telling. It points precisely to the link between theodicy 
and the social question and may shed additional light on the Malthus-Ricardo 
controversy in so far as it concerns precisely a decisive point in the controversy, 
namely, the status of political economy, either a science similar to mathematics or a part 
of ‘the science of moral and political philosophy’ (Malthus 1820, 1203; cf. Cremaschi 
2010). Ricardo’s limited scepticism, implying limits to moral knowledge, 
necessitarianism, the refusal of theodicy, played in favour of the former alternative.     
Note that rejection of theodicy in general implied also rejection of Malthus’s 1817 
version, namely a moral theodicy where evil is justified not as means to more happiness 
but as a spring for  moral improvement. That is, Ricardo’s mature view may have been 
that such social evils as poverty ought to be reduced but – unlike Malthus’s mature view 
– they are not made any more comprehensible by such considerations as that they are 
the spring of moral improvement, and indeed such considerations may border on 
blasphemy. Thus, waging war on poverty is still a moral imperative, but one that is still 
in force despite awareness of the tragic character of the human condition.  
Ricardo apparently disagrees, for different reasons, with Mill, Owen and  
Malthus, although it is with Malthus that he has more in common. The claims he seems 
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to reject are: 
 
(a) all work for the best (in Voltaire’s phrase, tout est bien); 
(b) evil is out there as a means to our moral improvement;  
 
while the claims he seems, instead, to endorse are: 
 
(a) evil is a hard fact for which no account is available; 
(b) yet we have a duty to do good, that is, to promote our neighbour’s happiness.  
 
Allow me to make a step forward and then come back. Max Weber, in his 
sociology of religion points at one basic function of religions, namely providing an 
answer to the question of the origins of evil. In his famous ‘Zwischenbetrachtungen’ he 
argued that, in a ‘rationalized’ world, the tension becomes obvious between a 
rationalized  economy and a religion that has itself been rationalized. Thus, ‘the 
religions of salvation have had a tendency to depersonalize and objectify love in the 
unique sense of acosmism. Yet [they] have watched with profound suspicion the 
deployment of economic forces which […] have likewise become impersonal’ (Weber 
1915: 331). In such religions, typically, the precept of love becomes universalized and 
every human being becomes a brother or sister, but this is bound to clash with the logic 
of the market where every human being, in an analogous universal way, tends to 
become one more magnitude in the quantified world of the market. He adds that money 
‘is the most abstract and “impersonal” element that ever existed. The more the world of 
the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is 
to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethics of brotherliness’ (Weber 1915: 
331). Ricardo somehow probably sensed Weber’s tension and went looking for a way 
out of it, while keeping his conviction of the existence of severe limits to human 
knowledge in mind, and thus refused to accept any of the social theodicies or 
anthropodicies that had been formulated – Godwin’s, the young Malthus’s, Mill’s – as 
intellectually arrogant and blasphemous. His final view was perhaps not too far, in 
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terms of policies, from Malthus’s last views but – we may speculate – still with one 
point of disagreement in terms of speculative issues. The point may have been that even 
a moral theodicy – that is Malthus’s 1817 version – according to which social evil is 
there to provide an occasion for moral improvement would have been for him both 
intellectually unwarranted and morally repugnant. To the question why there are 
poverty, destitution, diseases, high rates of mortality the only intellectually and morally 
acceptable answer is: we don’t know.  
This attitude, resulting from awareness of the existence of serious limits to human 
knowledge – both theoretical and moral – and the preoccupation of usefulness of 
knowledge is what marks Ricardo’s modest research program in political economy, a 
program whose spirit has been most of the time misunderstood by commentators as a 
kind of arrogant aprioristic deductivism mistaking idealized assumptions for the real 
world. It was precisely this attitude that was mistaken, shortly after his death, by his 
admirer Marx for a ‘Stoic, objective, scientific’ attitude (Marx 1965 – 1968, 2: 112) and 
by his detractor Leslie Stephen for lack of ‘human feeling’ (Stephen 1900, 2: 222)6. 
 
9. Conclusions 
1. Ricardo was apparently neither an atheist nor an agnostic; but belief and 
disbelief are existential attitudes, not theoretical claims, whether Ricardo believed or 
rather doubted – after all, who doesn’t doubt? – is not an appropriate question for 
historians; thus the pertinent question is whether he admitted the possibility of religious 
belief or instead ruled it out as irrational, and the answer is that his own philosophy was 
a kind of limited scepticism leaving room for religious belief for whoever would like to 
                                                 
6 To tell the whole truth – one disgusting enough to deserve being confined to a footnote 
– he wrote that Ricardo ‘was a Jew’ and ‘Jews, in spite of Shylock’s assertions […] are 




avail himself of this option.  
2. He argued for toleration not on the basis of the crude argument that religion is a 
fake – and even less on the even cruder one that, since he was himself an atheist, 
toleration for atheists was to be defended – but on the more rational one that nobody is 
the owner of the truth, there are several sets of beliefs that reasonable persons may 
adopt, and that even those who adopt absurd beliefs cannot be forced to change their 
beliefs at will.  
3. He believed that speculative theology is impracticable and irrelevant in so far as 
it is an attempt to formulate what is unknowable in terms of a scientific truth; note that 
he was not declaring the impossibility of faith, he was just declaring that formulating 
theological doctrines is an impracticable task; he was not advancing an argument in 
favour of atheism but one more argument against dogmatism and intolerance.   
4. He believed that morality is independent of revelation, that there is a natural 
morality accessible to every reasonable mind independent of different religious beliefs; 
note that this is typical Enlightenment staple shared by deist, theist, and liberal Christian 
thinkers; besides, that it is not a peculiarly ‘modern’ view, being just an old anti-
Augustinian and anti-Calvinist doctrine defended in the Middle Ages by Aquinas and 
William of Ockham, and in modern Britain by every enemy of religious fanaticism, 
from the Cambridge Platonists to Richard Price, Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith.  
5. He concluded that theodicy is impossible for the same reasons Kant advanced 
in order to prove ‘the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy’ and, unlike 
James Mill, believed that such conclusion is no argument for unbelief but rather one 
more argument for moral responsibility vis-à-vis poverty, against the kind of dogmatic 
laissez-faire optimism Mill and others were prone to adopt.  
6. Besides believing that, even though what every religion has to teach is precisely 
morality, the latter comes before religion and it is ‘autonomous’ in a somewhat Kantian 
sense; that is, he rejected the prevailing Anglican doctrine shared by Malthus that the 
moral law is a path to happiness and that virtue will be rewarded; for him a sense of 
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duty – including a duty to fight poverty – derives from reason, may be further 
confirmed by faith, but could hardly be grounded in the certainty that virtue will be 
rewarded.  
7. And he believed that social science should be a secular science precisely for 
theological reasons; in other words, leaving the biographical question aside, the anti-
dogmatic kind of religious belief to which Ricardo possibly adhered, but that certainly 
declared to be fully legitimate, ruled out both Malthus’s moral and political science and 
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Abstract 
I review evidence from published and unpublished sources on Ricardo’s theological 
ideas. The main focuses of interest are the existence of a natural morality independent 
of religious confessions, morality as the essence of religion, useless of theological 
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speculation, justification of toleration for everybody, including atheists, and the 
miscarriage of any attempt at a philosophical theodicy. The paper explores also the 
connection between Ricardo’s interest for theodicy and his views on the scope and 
method of political economy and suggests that his opinion that political economy 
should be a secular and value-free science close to mathematics depends precisely on 
theological reasons. 
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